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NOTES 
1. I attempt to develop the case against the reductionist position in detail 
in my book The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of 
Science (Harvard University Press, 1993). 
2. I must confess, in passing, that I am not at all sure what it is like to be 
me. Not, of course, because I happen to be ignorant on this point, but because I 
doubt whether the expression "what it is like to be me" makes any sense. 
God and Contemporary Science, by Philip Clayton. Eerdmans Pub. 
Co./Edinburgh University Press, 1997. Pp.xii and 274. $25. 
DAN D. CRAWFORD, University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
This book is one in the series Edinburgh Studies in Constmctive Theology 
which seeks to "[return] to the central themes of systematic theology, relat-
ing past thought to areas of contemporary concern in a way that is both 
faithful and creative." The volume under review, by Philip Clayton, a phi-
losophy professor at Sonoma State University and one of the series editors, 
is a creative mix of theological, philosophical, and scientific thinking. 
The work is primarily theological in orientation, starting from 
(Christian) theological premises and often appealing to faith and to the 
Bible as authoritative. The aim of the book is to develop an account of 
divine agency. But there is also a serious attempt to approach the subject 
philosophically, to construct an account that meets general standards of 
rationality and that has some grounding in what Clayton calls "universal 
argument". In addition, philosophy contributes to the formulation and 
defense of the panentheistic model of the divine nature that Clayton propos-
es in this work. Finally, and most importantly, the author attempts to 
defend theological beliefs in a way that takes science seriously and accom-
modates as far as possible current theory and "scientific conclusions". 
The debate with science is carried on on two fronts: first, Clayton tries to 
show how God's actions can be viewed as compatible with contemporary 
theory in the physical sciences and (to a lesser extent) cosmology. The 
question he asks is: how can God perform special acts within the natural 
realm without violating the well-confirmed laws of physics? And second, 
in the final chapter of the book, Clayton enters into the current debate in 
cognitive science over the nature of the human mind and its relation to the 
body and brain. He seeks to resolve the question of how conscious 
thoughts and intentions are connected to the physical world and to the 
brain as a way of throwing light on God's relation to the world. 
There are many suggestive ideas and authors' views discussed in this 
book that relate to the meeting-ground between theology and science. I 
have selected for consideration several topics that received the most sus-
tained treatment and argumentation. First, I will evaluate Clayton's con-
structive proposal of a panentheistic view of God, and then turn to how he 
engages with science on each of the two fronts mentioned above. My criti-
cism will be philosophical and not theological; that is, I will not attempt to 
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determine if his idea of God's activity is theologically adequate, but will 
limit myself to the task of reconstructing his positive ideas and arguments 
and assessing their cogency. 
Panentheism 
Clayton develops his panentheistic conception of God dialectically, try-
ing to steer a middle path between classical theism (with its overemphasis 
on God's transcendence) and pantheism (with its identification of God and 
world). There is also a bold attempt, reminiscent of Hegel, to trace the his-
torical development of the panentheistic idea, beginning with the Israelite 
conception of Yahweh as the one and only God, "not confused with any 
object in the world," but at the same time "present in all objects of the 
world". (28-29) "The Israelite authors bring us to this point but they do not 
take us beyond it. God is both transcendent and immanent, they teach, and 
yet the implications of this both/ and are not fully spelled out .... " (29) 
However, theologians in the last few centuries, reflecting on these ideas, 
found that they were" driven to formulate a panentheistic notion of God as 
both transcending and including the world." (115) 
How should we understand the immanent half of this panentheistic 
notion and the idea that God "includes" the world? Clayton explicates its 
meaning in a variety of ways, but it is unclear whether any of the key terms 
he uses to describe the relationship are supposed to be taken literally. 
He states that "God is fully immanent in the world; in him we live and 
move and have our being-and this in the strictest sense: to the extent that 
we have being at all, we are 'composed' out of him who is Being itself." (47) 
How are we composed out of him who is Being itself? " ... 'creation out 
of nothing' implies that we are composed of nothing other than God; no 
pre-existent matter served as our building blocks. Of course, creatio ex nihilo 
does not automatically mean creatio ex deo; it does not mean that we consist 
of God." (46, italics omitted) But still, it is not clear what being "composed 
out of him" means positively if it does not mean that we consist of God. 
In another discussion entitled "The Argument from Space" that draws on 
the work of Jiirgen Moltmann, the author reinterprets the doctrine of 
omnipresence to mean both that God is present in all things and that all 
things are within the divine presence. "God can be present here wIllie still 
subsuming all here's within a divine space that transcends and encompasses 
physical space." (89, italics added) We are thus able "to think of God as coex-
tensive with the world .... the world is contained within God; yet the world is 
not identical to God. Precisely this is the core thesis of panentheism." (90) 
We may well grant that the world is not identical to God because, on 
Clayton's view, God is the infinite creator of the world; but the author 
seems to be sidestepping the question of whether the world is identical 
with any part of God. More specifically, it is a core thesis of classical panen-
theism as formulated by A.N. Whitehead that God's transcendent nature is 
incomplete until it is actualized by the developing world of "actual enti-
ties". The world at any stage of its development is part of God, because it is 
God's abstract, ideal nature becoming concrete. But Clayton eschews both 
of these ideas-that the world completes God and that the world consti-
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tutes God. On his view, then, God may take his creatures to his bosom and 
be present to them in the closest possible way, but he does not constitute 
them and is not constituted by them. 
Clayton has attempted to shadow forth by means of the metaphors of 
'encompassing', 'subsuming within' and 'containing' a sense in which the 
world is within God. But what the claim boils down to is that the world is 
"similar" to God, that is, humans are created in God's image and thus 
"reflect" his nature; and the natural laws discovered by science reflect the 
constancy of God's character. But I do not see why the theist could not 
allow that the world is within God in these ways, and so I don't see that 
Clayton's panentheistic model forces any substantial revision in the classi-
cal theistic conception of God. It is finally just a matter of a greater empha-
sis on God's immanence. 
One reason Clayton cannot go as far as classical panentheism in identi-
fying the world and God is that the world is (in part) physical and the theis-
tic God is pure spirit. And so it is not at all clear how physical things are 
supposed to be encompassed by God or contained within him. In general, 
the material character of the world is seriously downplayed in this discus-
sion in favor of its finite and contingent character; and this is a problem for 
a view that wants to take science seriously. (We will return to this question 
below when we come to Clayton's account of the mind and its relation to 
the physical world.) 
Theology and the Physical Sciences 
The last half of the book (chapters 5-8) is devoted to working out a theo-
ry of divine agency that "pay[s] very close attention to scientific conclu-
sions." (238) The last two chapters, in which the author's constructive 
views are presented, are largely independent of each other-the first deal-
ing with God's interventions in the physical realm, where the dialogue is 
mainly with physics; the second dealing with how we are to conceive of 
divine and human agency, where the dialogue is carried on with cognitive 
science and the philosophy of mind. 
Clayton assumes in these discussions that "scientific results" can be sepa-
rated from their metaphysical interpretations which are always "speculative" 
and underdetermined by their empirical data. (But this distinction is over-
simple: where do theories fall within it-say the theory of quantum 
mechanics--{)n the side of unquestioned scientific "results" or on the side of 
arguable interpretation?) Clayton holds that scientific results (and theories?) 
demand some sort of metaphysical interpretation (they "plead" for it) (161); 
and he thinks that ultimately they require a theological interpretation. 
The metaphysical interpretation that science endorses is naturalism, 
which is defined roughly as a view that rules in naturalistic causes and 
explanations and rules out divine causes and explanations. Clayton views 
his task as arguing "in the face of naturalism" (151) "that theism in general, 
and panentheism in particular, is ... best able to integrate the scientific 
results with what we know of our existence as human beings in this 
world." (160) In the debate with science, he allows that some theological 
beliefs may have to be revised; but he also thinks that theology, guided by 
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its own set of doctrines and beliefs, may sometimes overrule scientific con-
clusions. 
Does God Intervene? 
Clayton begins his discussion with a helpful review of a number of dif-
ferent proposed accounts of how God might act in the physical realm, and 
moves toward a constructive account of his own that incorporates aspects 
of these views. The integrative theories of John Polkinghorne and Arthur 
Peacocke are given the most prominence. 
The theological constraints on the topic are based on the doctrine of 
providence, that God ultimately controls human history and that God may 
perform special acts that affect individuals or groups. Clayton rejects 
Peacocke's naturalistic model of revelation and wants to keep the door 
open for "particular intentions on the part of God." (226) On the side of sci-
ence, there is a strong presumption in favor of the explanation of all events 
in terms of physical laws. Also there are good theological reasons for think-
ing that God would not want to act in a way that violated natural laws-
namely that the natural order is an expression of God's initial creative act 
and purpose. So, much of Clayton's discussion of God's activity is meant to 
show how God can act on occasion without violating the laws of the physi-
cal sciences. Nor do we want to locate God's actions in the gaps or cracks 
of science, since past attempts to do this have too often found that science 
has soon filled these gaps to the embarrassment of theology. 
It is however significant that although physics has made its case for nat-
ural laws governing physical events, Clayton does not think the same is 
true of the social sciences; more specifically, there is no similar presumption 
in favor of psychological laws that explain human thinking and willing. 
Clayton thinks it is natural to look for God's actions at the level of the 
"smallest particles" since (citing physicist Karl Young) "all current bets in 
physics are on a fundamental theory of the natural world being based 
essentially on relativity and quantum mechanics." (193) The view that he 
finds most promising is that God intervenes at the level of indeterminate 
quantum events. This is not locating God's actions in the cracks of science 
because the best current theory is that these indeterminacies are ontologi-
cally real, and so science will never be able to find more than statistical 
laws governing these events. His idea is that it is reasonable to believe that 
these spaces where God acts are in nature and not simply in our knowl-
edge of nature. 1/ A full doctrine of God requires an open world, one with 
causal spaces in which God can act." (212) 
Clayton's attempt to specify the locus, the "causal joint", of the divine 
agent's interventions in a way that still allows for physicalistic explana-
tions is suggestive (and ingenious). (I have had to omit his fascinating dis-
cussion of how chaos theory has opened up another possible avenue of 
divine influence.) But there are problems-some of them raised by 
Polkinghorne and Peacocke-with locating God's activity at the quantum 
level that Clayton mentions, but does not adequately answer. 
First, God would have to act infrequently enough that he did not alter 
the statistical probabilities of those events. If God makes minute changes 
that produce a pattern of effects at the level of history as a whole, it is not 
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clear why this wouldn't be contravening the statistical laws that would 
otherwise regulate those events. Even a single intervention would alter the 
probability law that exactly governs events of that kind-whether or not 
humans could detect the anomaly; so God would still be violating the nat-
ural order that he put into place at creation. 
If God wants to intervene in the world-say to inspire the prophet or to 
harden pharoah's heart, then he is going to alter the natural course of 
events. But it would seem that the best avenue for effecting this change, on 
Clayton's view of the natural realm, is to act directly on the mind and will 
of the human subject, since there are no known laws to violate in the psy-
chological realm. But Clayton thinks that God acts most rationally if he ini-
tiates a microphysical quantum change in the brain which then, by upward 
causation, produces the desired mental change. It may seem that, on this 
view, God is going to a lot of trouble to avoid the appearance of irrationali-
ty. But if the objection I raised above is correct, then it doesn't really help if 
God acts on the brain directly (and indirectly on the mind) for he would 
still be acting contrary to natural (statistical) laws. 
Divine Agency and Physicalism 
In the concluding chapter 8, Clayton turns to the question of how we are 
to conceive of divine action. He notes first that we must think of divine 
agency by analogy with human agency. And so the first order of business 
is to form an adequate conception of the human mind and its relation to 
the physical world. Specifically, we need to "solve the problem of human 
mental causation-the question of how human intentions and desires get 
translated into events in the physical world." (233) For if we understand 
this, then we can move by inference to an analogous characterization of 
God's activity in the world. 
Clayton attempts to develop an adequate theory of mind by entering 
into the thorny debate within cognitive science about the nature of the 
mind, including consciousness, and its relation to the body. What he finds 
of course is that the dominant view of the mind is functionalist, physicalist, 
and reductionist. His main target is a view of the mind that combines 
physicalism (defined roughly as the view that everything that exists in the 
natural realm is physical) and reductionism (defined roughly as the idea 
that the mental can be fully understood and explained in terms of the 
physical). This view of the mind is antithetical to the theistic ideas of God 
as pure spirit and the survival of the individual after death. But more 
importantly for Clayton's project, if mental states are unreal or are 
reducible to brain states, then when the "panentheistic analogy" between 
God's relation to the world and the mind's relation to the body is pressed 
(as it is in this chapter), we will be forced to understand God as a physical 
being (pantheism), or as an aspect of the physical world whose existence is 
dependent on the world's existence. And this is unacceptable theologically. 
The theologian's task, then, is first and foremost to secure the irreducibili-
ty of mind and consciousness. Accordingly, Clayton stakes out a position 
within the current debate in cognitive science that would show that con-
scious mental states (a) exist in their own right; and (b) have an autonomy 
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from the body and brain. He defends the latter thesis by arguing that men-
tal states have "causal powers", viz., they are causally effective in produc-
ing other mental states and changes in the physical body. The two theses 
are connected because if he can establish that mental states have causal 
powers, then this is a basis for claiming that they have a reality separate 
from the body. 
Clayton's arguments for these theses finally rest on an appeal to our 
commonsense assumption that mental states can cause other mental states 
("the idea of '23 + 47' ... gives rise to the idea of '70"'), (254) and that mental 
states can cause physical states (your "intention to cease reading this book 
... [can] cause your eyes to cease moving across this page" ) (255). Beyond 
this, he asserts that there is no reason to think that the folk psychological 
explanations in terms of thoughts and intentions could ever be replaced by 
explanations in terms of neurological processes. 
Clayton's aim is to secure a place for mind in the physical world. 
Conscious mental states are real. This is not to say that minds are real 
things or substances; he concurs with science that there is no place in nature 
for immaterial substances. Instead he uses the language of 'emergence' and 
'supervenience' to define the relation of mind to body. 
But how exactly is mental causation possible? Recall that Clayton set 
himself the task of resolving the question of "how human intentions get 
translated into events in the physical world" in order to throw light on 
how God can act on the world. The question is also important for his larger 
panentheistic thesis because in this chapter he is pressing the "panentheis-
tic analogy" between the mind's relation to the body and God's relation to 
the world. But unfortunately Clayton has nothing to say about how minds 
can effect changes in the physical world beyond pointing to the obvious 
fact that since humans commonly do effect change, then it must be possible 
to do this without violating natural laws. But this doesn't resolve anything. 
For if minds are emergent existents that can induce changes in their neuro-
logical substructures that cannot be explained by antecedent neurological 
states, then it is problematic how this could occur without violating physi-
cal laws. (Note that it wouldn't be a problem if those mental states were 
properties of the physical brain.) More must be said about how minds can 
produce change in the world and in the brain once they have been given 
the degree of autonomy Clayton gives them. 
This omission is part of a larger shortcoming in the book. Just as Clayton 
could not find a place for the physical in God's nature, so he is uncertain 
about how the body is a part of human nature. At one point he says that 
one of his aims is to develop a "more holistic" conception of the human 
person-one that is in keeping with the Biblical idea-that views the per-
son as "an integrated set of connections between her mental and physical 
functions." (236) One looks in vain for these connections; what one finds 
instead is the bare assertion that mental causation can occur. 
I want to suggest that there may be more resources within cognitive sci-
ence for mind-body inter-connections than Clayton has tapped. In his bat-
tle with physicalism, Clayton has pointed to tendencies within cognitive 
science that separate the mind and consciousness from the body, citing 
Thomas Nagel and Colin McGinn, for example. But there is a strand in this 
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debate-notably in the work of Mark Johnson and Maxine Sheetz-
Johnstone-that emphasizes the dependency of conscious life on the body 
and the way in which our concept of mental processes is built on a concept 
of bodily processes. This line of thought is physicalist to be sure (as are all 
the views that Clayton considers), but it is not reductionist and is fully con-
sistent with a robust view of an autonomous mental life. It would seem 
that this is an approach to the mind that Clayton should pay some atten-
tion to. Why doesn't he? I suggest that Clayton isn't interested in identify-
ing mind-body connections that are being worked out by cognitive scien-
tists, and in applying them by analogy to God's nature, because there is no 
place in God for the physical. To press the panentheistic analogy too close-
ly would make it too close for theological comfort. 
Clayton seeks a rapprochement with science, and he goes some way 
toward showing how classical theistic beliefs about divine action are com-
patible with current physical theories and with cognitive science. But he 
cannot find a way to appropriate the physicalist assumption of science, and 
the main thrust of his argument is to reject it. The theological ideas that 
God is pure spirit and that humans can survive death finally lead him to a 
metaphysics of the person that stresses the separateness of mind from 
body, and that downplays the role of the body in human experience. 
Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory, by John Finnis. Oxford 
University Press, 1998. Pp. xxi and 385. Price $18.95 (paperback). 
ROBERT PASNAU, University of Colorado 
The study of philosophy's history is often a tedious affair, devoted to pri-
mary texts that seem only intermittently relevant today and to secondary 
studies that offer at best a pale reflection of the great minds they pursue. 
But every once in a while a study is published that sheds real light on some 
historical period, and one feels as if here, at last, some long-dead philoso-
pher has finally been favored with an interpreter worthy of the task. 
John Finnis is such an interpreter, and his new book is such a study. 
Amidst a flurry of important works published over the past few years on 
Thomas Aquinas, Finnis's Aquinas stands out as the most philosophically 
insightful and provocative of them alP 
In one respect this book cannot be judged by its cover, which reads sim-
ply I Aquinas,' suggesting a general survey of the man and his work. The 
subtitle (revealed on the title page) provides an accurate picture of the 
book's exclusive focus on moral and political philosophy, a focus that is 
particularly welcome given the relative neglect of these topics in the litera-
ture on Aquinas. 
In another respect this book very much can be judged by its cover. For 
inasmuch as one knows the work of John Finnis, one already will have quite 
a good sense of the views presented here. One will rightly suppose that it 
offers a detailed account of Aquinas's theory of human action, that it pre-
sents an intelligent and attractive version of Aquinas's natural law theory, 
